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Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in
Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the
As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in
Constitutional Law'
by DAVID L. FAIGMAN**
Introduction
Early in the litigation involving attempts to desegregate American
public schools, Thurgood Marshall heard about research being done by a
young sociologist at Columbia University.' Dr. Kenneth Clark had used
dolls-two pink and two brown, which he bought for fifty cents at a five-
and-ten on 125th Street in New York-to demonstrate that black school
children in segregated schools had lower self-esteem and more
psychological problems than black children who attended integrated
schools.2 When Marshall heard about Clark's doll test he thought it "a
promising way of showing injury to these segregated youngsters. I wanted
this kind of evidence on the record."3 After deciding to use this evidence,
Marshall next had to decide how to frame the empirical claim he was
making. There were at least two possibilities. First, the research already
done and published might have provided the framework within which to
understand segregation's effects. The fact that segregation was cancerous
to the black communities that suffered its degradations would be
demonstrated by this work. In effect, Marshall could have sought to
demonstrate the psychological injuries caused by Jim Crow as a general
matter, just as one might demonstrate that certain chemicals found in the
* This manuscript is adapted from, and expands upon, portions of a chapter appearing in
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS, (Oxford Univ.
Press 2008).
** John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 315-16 (1975).
2. Id. at 315-18.
3. Id. at 316.
[6311
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 631 2008-2009
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
drinking water supply could cause cancer. Marshall might have wanted to
demonstrate that these general effects had become real in the specific
jurisdictions that were part of Brown v. Board of Education.4 This would
require having Clark or other researchers replicate the original research in
the five jurisdictions that were the subject of the Brown litigation. The
question, in short, was what was the constitutionally relevant factual
inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment? Was the Equal Protection
Clause violated if segregation had injurious societal effects or did a
challenger have to demonstrate that segregation caused a specific injury to
him or her? This question, it turns out, arises constantly throughout
constitutional adjudication, though the answers are rarely explained
adequately. This is unfortunate because the frames of reference used to
reconcile constitutional claims can substantially affect their outcomes.
When the five cases that constituted the Brown litigation reached the
United States Supreme Court, the justices also displayed confusion as to
the appropriate way to frame the empirical issue presented. It was unclear
whether the factual claim being made by the NAACP applied to all black
children in segregated conditions or only the specific children involved in
the cases argued below. Marshall, following the time-honored tradition of
most litigation, had introduced evidence at all five trials regarding both the
general effects of segregation in society and its effects in the particular
jurisdictions involved in the cases.5 At oral argument in the Topeka case,
the NAACP's Robert Carter asked the Court to abide by the district court's
finding of fact that segregation had deleterious psychological
6
consequences. He told the Court that the lower court's factual findings
made a reversal "necessary.",7 He argued, "If there [are inequalities] in
fact, that educational opportunities cannot be equal in law." 8 Justice Hugo
Black asked him whether that was "'a general finding or do you state that
for the State of Kansas, City of Topeka?" 9 Surprisingly, Carter told the
justices that "the finding refers to the State of Kansas and to these
appellants and to Topeka, Kansas." He added, "I think that the findings
4. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). A third possibility, highly relevant to
the discussion that follows, was to demonstrate segregation's effects on the specifically named
litigants.
5. See id. at 492.
6. REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY: The Record of Brown v. Board of Education 131-32
(Mark Whitman ed., 1993).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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were made in this specific case referring to this specific case."' Black was
troubled by the ramifications of limiting the empirical lesson to the single
case of Topeka and asked whether this meant that "then you would have
different rulings with respect to the places to which this applies, is that
true?"" Carter quickly realized his error, though in his haste to backtrack
he too readily abandoned the general social science available. He argued,
"[n]ow, of course, under our theory, you do not have to reach the finding of
fact or a fact at all in reaching the decision because of the fact that we
maintain that this is an unconstitutional classification being based upon
race and, therefore, it is arbitrary."'
' 2
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren framed the
decision around the general findings regarding segregation's effects. The
Court famously quoted the three-judge district court's finding that
"'Segregation with the sanction of law ... has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them
of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system.""' 13  "Modem authority," the Court asserted, supported this
conclusion.' 4 Despite the controversy sparked by citation to the work of
Clark and others, the Court's chosen frame of reference-that is, its
resolution of the factual dispute as a general matter rather than case-by-
case-was largely uncontroversial at the time or since. Yet, as suggested at
oral argument, the Court could have chosen a case-by-case frame of
reference;" it simply chose not to.
The history of Brown would have been very different if the Court had
required case-by-case proof of segregation's deleterious effects. It would
have required courts to consider segregation's effects case-by-case, each
requiring a separate trial on the facts in each specific locale. Indeed, such a
holding would have largely enfeebled the decision's guarantee of equality.
In numerous other contexts, however, the Court employs a case-by-case
frame of reference, with exactly the enfeebling effect avoided in Brown. A
particularly stark example of this is the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart ("Carhart If'), in which the Court upheld the Federal Partial Birth
Abortion Act of 2003 ("Act").' 6 In Carhart II, the Court rejected a facial
challenge despite considerable general proof that "the Act has the effect of
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
14. Id.
15. See REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY, supra note 6, at 131-32.
16. Gonzalez v. Carhart (Carhart I), 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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imposing an unconstitutional burden on the abortion right because it does
not allow use of the barred procedure where necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the health of the mother."17 The
Court ruled, instead, that this fact must be proved individually for claimants
in every case.18 Like Brown, however, the Court utterly failed to consider
what frame of reference it should use in deciding the challenge. Yet this
ostensibly procedural ruling had the effect of entirely undermining the
substantive right conceded to exist in Carhart I.
This Article explores the issue of factual frames of reference and how
the Court surreptitiously manipulates the relevant frame to serve
substantive objectives.' 9 This manipulation entails the Court's moving
back and forth between general facts and case-specific facts, what Kenneth
Culp Davis referred to as legislative facts and adjudicative facts. Part I
summarizes Davis's classification scheme and suggests a modification that
applies to constitutional facts. Part II considers the consequences
associated with choosing a particular frame of reference and demonstrates
how this choice fundamentally alters the sum and substance of
constitutional decisions. Special attention is paid to facial versus as-
applied challenges, since this is the context in which the debate over frames
of reference has played out in the case law. As made clear in this section,
however, the debate over facial versus as-applied challenges is merely a
subcategory of the pervasive issue concerning defining the proper frame of
reference for empirical questions arising under the Constitution. Part III
turns to the challenging question of how the Court should decide what
frame of reference should apply in different constitutional contexts. This
part concludes that the question of how to properly frame a constitutional
empirical inquiry is itself a matter of interpreting the Constitution and
suggests factors that might help guide that interpretation.
17. Id. at 161 (citation omitted).
18. See id. at 168.
19. It should be observed at the outset that the concern over what frame of reference applies
in particular constitutional contexts is fundamentally different from the debate sparked by Justice
Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). In footnote six of that decision,
though joined by no other justice, Scalia argued that substantive due process rights should be
defined at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. In my lexicon, whether the tradition is defined
narrowly or broadly, it remains a constitutional reviewable fact. Although the question of
specifically what kinds of reviewable facts are relevant is a key and contentious issue in
constitutional adjudication, it is, as Justice Scalia's footnote illustrates, well understood by judges
and scholars. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). In comparison, the subject of this section
appears less well understood, since the Court seems to believe that it can move seamlessly
between case-specific and reviewable facts without affecting constitutional meaning.
[Vol. 36:4
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I. Fact Classification
In a landmark article, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis identified two
basic kinds of facts having evidentiary significance.2 ° The first he termed
"legislative facts," and the second he called "adjudicative facts."'" This
division of the empirical world into two categories was originally proposed
in the context of administrative law, though this nomenclature has been
adopted in many other legal contexts, 22 including in constitutional cases.
23
Although the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts is
serviceable in constitutional cases, this section sets forth a modification of
this classic dichotomy and argues that a three-category taxonomy better
captures the nature of constitutional fact questions. These categories are
doctrinal facts, reviewable facts, and case-specific facts.
A. Davis's Legislative and Adjudicative Facts
Professor Davis divided the law's empirical world between legislative
and adjudicative facts.24 According to Davis, legislative facts are those
facts that have relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal
rules.25 Adjudicative facts, in contrast, are relevant to the resolution of
particular cases. Davis explained that "[a]djudicative facts usually answer
the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive
or intent . . . . Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law
and policy and discretion., 26  Judges typically decide questions of
legislative fact.27 Adjudicative facts, on the other hand, are usually within
20. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402-03 (1942).
21. Id.
22. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(a) states the following:
The omission of any treatment of legislative facts results from fundamental differences
between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are simply the facts
of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have
relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a
legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
23. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
24. Davis, supra note 20, at 402-03.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note ("Legislative facts ... are those
which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation
of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.").
26. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
27. See id.; see also Davis, supra note 20, at 402 (noting that the rules of evidence for
finding facts that form the basis for creation of law and policy should differ from the rules for
finding facts specific to parties in a particular case).
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the province of the trier of fact (the jury or, if there is no jury, the judge) to
decide.28
A key distinguishing feature between legislative and adjudicative facts
is the level of decision-making at which the asserted facts are relevant.
Whereas legislative facts ordinarily relate to matters that transcend
individual disputes and would likely recur in different cases involving
similar subjects, adjudicative facts ordinarily are peculiar to a particular
case.29 In McCleskey v. Kemp, for example, the petitioner claimed that
Georgia's capital sentencing scheme discriminated on the basis of the race
of the victim. 30  This allegation was based on an extensive and
sophisticated study conducted by Professor David Baldus and his
colleagues. 31 Among other things, Baldus concluded that, all things being
equal, "defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as
likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks. 32 This discrimination claim was based on legislative facts, in that
it was directed at the Georgia system as a whole and McCleskey offered no
evidence that he personally was a victim of discrimination. As Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, pointed out, "Even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove ... that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case. 3 3  Indeed, of great concern for the Court was that
"McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. 3 4
28. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker expanded upon the Davis dichotomy by
adding a third category that they call "social frameworks." Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563-70 (1987).
29. The reason I say "ordinarily" is that there is a basic ambiguity inherent in Davis's
categories. His division of facts into legislative and adjudicative categories is based on how the
fact-finder employs the particular fact. If the fact is used to resolve a particular litigation, it is, by
definition, "adjudicative." This is so even though the factual issue may transcend a particular
dispute, such as whether second-hand smoke causes lung cancer or silicone implants cause
autoimmune disorders. Similarly, if a legislature points to a particular case to support its
lawmaking-as occurred in the "right-to-die" controversy involving Terri Schiavo in 2005-this
particularized fact is, by definition, "legislative." The scheme I develop in this section for the
constitutional arena largely avoids this ambiguity because the generality or specificity of the
factual inquiry operates as the definitional feature of my framework.
30. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987).
31. Id. at 286-87.
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 308.
34. Id. at314-15.
[Vol. 36:4
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Legislative facts, as their name connotes, typically have broad impact
across large areas of the law.35
How the constitutionally relevant inquiry is described, therefore, as
being at either the adjudicative or legislative level, is obviously of great
importance. In principle, the Constitution itself establishes what sorts of
facts are relevant under its dictates. In other words, the description of the
relevant factual inquiry under a particular provision of the Constitution is a
matter of interpretation. In the cases leading up to McCleskey, for instance,
the Court had indicated that substantial evidence of systemic discrimination
would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.36 The relevant facts
under this earlier interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, then, were
legislative in character. In McCleskey, however, the Court stepped away
from this precedent. In its new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court redefined the level of relevant fact-finding. The McCleskey
Court said that the relevant facts under the Eighth Amendment were case
specific, or adjudicative, and held that claims of systemic discrimination
were insufficient to sustain a cause of action.37
The McCleskey decision nicely illustrates the profound implications
that surround the decision regarding what class of fact is relevant under a
particular constitutional provision. The type of fact affects what sort of
proof might be proffered and, indeed, whether it is realistically provable at
all. It also affects the identity of the trier of fact and the manner in which
evidence is introduced into the process. Adjudicative facts are often tried
to juries, offered through percipient witnesses pursuant to applicable codes
of evidence, and strict rules of appellate procedure control the admission of
evidence after trial. Also, when proof is in the form of adjudicative facts,
prospects for success lie almost entirely with trial counsel and his or her
talents. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, resolutions of adjudicative
facts have limited import, since they typically bear upon only individual
cases.
Legislative facts, in contrast, are tried to judges and are usually the
subject of expert testimony and extensive briefing. They have broad
35. See Davis, supra note 20, at 402 ("The rules of evidence for finding facts which form the
basis for creation of law and determination of policy should differ from the rules for finding facts
which concern only the parties to a particular case.").
36. See, e.g., id. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A constitutional violation is established if
a plaintiff demonstrates a 'pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing."' (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 195 n.46 (1976))).
37. Id. at 292-93. McCleskey's alternative ground for a discrimination claim was the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court, however, had long required such
claims to be individualized because intentional discrimination had to be proven. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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impact and usually affect large numbers of cases. Although rules of
evidence might apply to expert testimony regarding legislative facts
introduced at trial, much of the evidence for such facts enters through
alternative corridors, ranging from legislative hearing transcripts to
independent judicial research. Also, appellate courts revisit legislative fact
questions de novo. Moreover, especially in high profile cases, courts
receive considerable assistance from amicus briefs regarding legislative
facts, often including input from highly prestigious organizations. Without
question, then, and not simply at the margins, classifying the pertinent fact
as either adjudicative or legislative makes a considerable difference. In
constitutional cases, these differences have profound consequences.
B. A Taxonomy for Constitutional Facts
Davis's dichotomy generally describes the fact-finding that occurs in
constitutional cases and it has become the established vocabulary for
describing the kinds of facts that are relevant to legal discourse. 38 My
approach roughly parallels that of Davis, though the constitutional arena
requires refinement of his scheme. Davis's legislative fact category can be
further distilled in the constitutional context into two subcategories,
"constitutional doctrinal facts" and "constitutional reviewable facts." This
revision turns out to have special relevance for constructing procedural
rules in constitutional cases. Davis's adjudicative fact category is more
clearly phrased as simply constitutional case-specific facts, since this term
neatly describes the import of the pertinent findings of fact. Hence, in
constitutional cases, facts assume three basic forms-doctrinal, reviewable,
and case-specific. Their simplicity in form, however, belies their
complexity in practice.
Constitutional doctrinal facts are advanced to substantiate a particular
interpretation of the Constitution. Doctrinal facts join, and sometimes are a
component of, the traditional sources of authority-the text, original intent,
constitutional structure, precedent, scholarship, and contemporary values-
in establishing the meaning of the Constitution.39 Indeed, original intent,
one of the most common bases for constitutional interpretation, is almost
38. Judge Robert Keeton has suggested the use of the term "premise facts" to describe any
facts that support a reasoned decision of law or policy. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and
Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MtNN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1988).
39. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring The
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 542-44 (1991).
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. Rev. 1189, 1244-46 (1987); Michael Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 CAL. L. REv. 551, 552
(1985).
[Vol. 36:4
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 638 2008-2009
DEFINING EMPIRICAL FRAMES OF REFERENCE
wholly fact based. Most debates over original intent concern
disagreements over historical facts, such as whether the drafters or ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the Equal Protection Clause to
invalidate segregated public schools 40 or whether the Free Speech Clause
was intended to cover obscenity. 4' In addition, many arguments based on
constitutional structure depend on hypotheses that might be the subject of
political science or sociology. John Marshall's assertion in Marbury v.
Madison,42 for instance, that legislators are less likely than judges to be
bound by a written constitution, is a doctrinal fact of this sort.43 Doctrinal
facts, therefore, are employed to determine or justify the development of
rules or standards that apply to all similarly situated cases.
Constitutional reviewable facts embody the more generally recognized
function of legislative fact-finding in constitutional cases. Courts examine
reviewable facts under the pertinent constitutional rule or standard in order
to determine the constitutionality of some state or federal action.
Reviewable facts transcend particular disputes and thus can recur in
identical form in different cases and varying jurisdictions. Under the
Commerce Clause, for instance, the applicable standard asks, among other
things, whether the federal law "substantially affects interstate
commerce." 44 A good example comes from Gonzales v. Raich,45 in which
the Court determined whether Congress had the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the home production of marijuana. Under
the applicable standard, the Court had to consider whether Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that home production of marijuana
substantially affects price and national market conditions for marijuana.46
After reviewing the record and Congress's reasons for regulating, the Court
concluded that "the regulation is squarely within Congress' [s] commerce
power because production of [marijuana] . . . has a substantial effect on
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. 47  The
Court explained that:
40. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
41. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 104 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
42. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
43. Id. at 176 ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written.").
44. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
45. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
Summer 2009]
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One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a
nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana ... locally
cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by
friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial
impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular
substance.48
The Court concluded that Congress's judgment is "not only rational, but
'visible to the naked eye,' under any commonsense appraisal of the
probable consequences of such an open-ended exemption., 49
Constitutional doctrinal facts and constitutional reviewable facts
involve factual determinations that transcend particular cases and are
relevant to either the formation of a constitutional test or the application of
a test to similarly occurring cases, respectively. Constitutional case-
specific facts, in contrast, refer to factual determinations that are relevant to
the application of constitutional rules in particular cases. For example, the
question whether a police department "intentionally discriminated" against
black police officers when hiring decisions were made based on an exam
on which whites received significantly higher scores raises a case-specific
fact issue.5° Similarly, the likely consequences of Nazis marching through
a predominantly Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois, would be a case-
specific fact.5
Case-specific facts, however, operate at various levels of complexity
in regard to applicable constitutional norms. For example, in Hudson v.
McMillan,52 Hudson, a prison inmate, claimed that defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights when they handcuffed and shackled him and
then punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach.53  The legal
standard applicable in Hudson was "the settled rule that 'the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. ,, 54 The defendants had claimed that
the Eighth Amendment was implicated only when "serious injury"
occurred.55 The Court rejected this argument, stating,
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 28-29 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995)).
50. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. See Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Viii. ofSkokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam).
52. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 5 (internal quotation omitted).
55. See id. at 2.
[Vol. 36:4
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[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may
suggest "whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought
necessary" in a particular situation, "or instead evinced such
wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is
tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur."
56
Hence, "[t]he absence of serious injury is therefore relevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry, but does not end it."57
No bright lines mark the boundaries between doctrinal, reviewable,
and case-specific constitutional facts. Indeed, uncertainty surrounding fact-
categorization arises across the entire sweep of constitutional cases. Since
the procedural standards courts use depend on these categorizations,
however, ambiguity in this area is a matter of some consequence. The
process of determining what facts are constitutionally relevant, and what
category they fall into, must be determined on a case-by-case or
constitutional provision-by-constitutional provision basis. The next section
explores the methods by which constitutional facts might be classified and
the vagaries that attach to those ways.
C. Denominating Constitutional Facts
The three types of constitutional facts-doctrinal, reviewable, and
case-specific-present very different profiles in regard to constitutional
adjudication. Case-specific facts are often decided by juries and have
limited precedential impact. They tend to be decided squarely within the
parameters of the traditional adversarial process in which, for the most part,
ordinary rules of civil procedure and evidence apply. Doctrinal facts, in
contrast, inform the definition of rules and standards that apply broadly, are
decided exclusively by judges, and establish binding precedent. Although
the adversarial process will inform the discovery of constitutional doctrinal
facts, such fact-finding cannot be limited to the talents of counsel for the
parties. Finally, reviewable facts transcend individual cases, are usually
decided by judges, and have substantial precedential force. Reviewable
facts are likely to be heavily influenced by the traditional rules of the
adversarial process-with much of the evidence for reviewable facts heard
at trial-but are routinely the subject of substantial exposition by parallel
means, such as amicus briefs and research by judges.
Nothing inherent in a particular constitutional fact dictates whether it
is a doctrinal or reviewable fact. Categorization depends on how a
particular court employs the fact, and this might only be determined in
56. Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
57. Id.
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particular constitutional contexts by subsequent case law.58 Consider, for
example, the trimester framework that was set forth in Roe v. Wade. 59 The
Roe Court established two points-in-time during a pregnancy that have
constitutional significance. 60  Both of these were premised on "present
medical knowledge" and operated to regulate when the state's interests in
maternal health and the potential life of the fetus became sufficiently
compelling to support regulation.61 According to the Court, the state's
''compelling" interest in the health of the mother begins at the end of the
first trimester. 62  "This is so," Justice Blackmun wrote, "because of the
now-established medical fact [that] until the end of the first trimester
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.,
63
Blackmun ruled further that "[w]ith respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability.
' 64
He explained: "This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. 65
In establishing 12 and 24 weeks as constitutionally significant, the
question arises as to whether the Court meant to use medical technology to
establish a categorical constitutional rule or a standard that might be
informed by changing technology. If weeks 12 and 24 were rule based,
then changes in technology-i.e., medical advances that substantially
improved the safety of abortions or moved up the time of viability-should
not specifically undermine the Court's decision. A rule is a rule. But if the
junctures of 12 and 24 weeks raised the reviewable facts of abortion safety
and viability, respectively, then the balance established in Roe might be
expected to change as medical technology progressed. Justice O'Connor,
58. The sometimes ambiguous character of constitutional facts complicates the task of
establishing a rational constitutional-fact jurisprudence, but it is not fatal to that effort, and this
level of uncertainty is not unknown in constitutional cases. Consider, for example, the
longstanding debate over whether the Miranda rule was constitutionally mandated or a judicially
enacted remedy that could be revisited by legislative majorities. This ambiguity remained in the
law for more than thirty years. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth
the now-famous "Miranda warning," but leaving open the question whether it was
constitutionally based), with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("Miranda
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.").
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
60. See id. at 162-64.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
[Vol. 36:4
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for instance, read Roe to create a standard66 since she believed that
changing technology would alter the Court's jurisprudence. In Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, she warned in dissent that, due to
recent advances in medicine, linking the constitutional framework in Roe to
medical technology had set it "on a collision course with itself., 68 When
Akron was decided in 1983, abortion had become safer than childbirth
through approximately week 16 and the time of viability was expected to
creep toward conception.69
The answer to whether Roe's trimester framework established a
reviewable standard rather than a categorical rule is revealed by subsequent
case law. It turns out that O'Connor was partly correct and partly
mistaken. The first trimester junction was deemed a per se rule, in which
medical realities were considered largely meaningless, whereas viability
has been applied throughout as a standard, in which medical realities are
reviewable facts that might change over time. The Akron Court rejected
the suggestion that changes in technology mandated postponement of the
state's interest in maternal health from the twelfth week to the sixteenth
week .70 Week 12 operated as a bright-line test of when the government's
interest regulating maternal health became compelling, even if the original
reason for the rule had been undermined by advances in technology.
Accordingly, the Court stated that despite the changed fact-of-the-matter,
the "trimester standard . . . continues to provide a reasonable legal
framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate abortions.' The
first trimester juncture was thus interpreted in Akron as a rule that was
largely insensitive to changing empirical knowledge. This ended when
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey72 rejected the
first leg of the trimester framework-overturning Akron-and replaced it
with the standards-based undue burden test.
Casey, however, retained the second leg of the trimester framework,
viability, which has consistently been treated as a standard by the Court in
cases following Roe.73 Describing viability as a standard suggests that if
medical technology were to change, the contour of the "right" would
66. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 429 n. 11.
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1991).
73. Id. at 837.
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change as well. Hence, if viability moves from 22 to 24 weeks to 10 to 12
weeks as a matter of medical fact, then the right of reproductive choice
should presumably move as well. Indeed, this is one of the principal
features of employing standards that depend on possibly different
circumstances occurring from those that existed when the test was first set
forth. It could be argued, however, that the compromise point-viability-
was really chosen for certain unstated reasons, such as giving the pregnant
woman sufficient time to exercise her right to an abortion. Under this
interpretation of Roe, the test is not viability at all, but rather the end of the
second trimester-24 weeks-approximately the time at which viability
occurred in 1973, when Roe was decided. Of course, changes in
technology or medical science would not affect a rule of 24 weeks. But the
Court never said that the rule was 24 weeks; it said, and thereafter has
maintained, that the law is "viability"-whenever that should occur.74
Only subsequent cases can reveal whether the test in Roe was the
standard of "viability" or the rule of "24 weeks." If the former, then
changing technology should lead the Court to contemplate an alteration in
the 24-week point-in-time, whereas if the latter, then 24 weeks should
remain inviolate, subject always to the possibility of it being replaced with
another rule. The ostensible answer comes from Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.75  In Webster, the Court upheld a Missouri law that,
among other things, required physicians to use medically appropriate tests
to determine whether a fetus was viable at 20 or more weeks of gestational
age.76 Although the Court did not discuss the issue explicitly, it effectively
accepted the Missouri scheme of treating viability as a constitutional case-
specific fact. After 20 weeks, the viability of every fetus was to be
measured individually. In contrast, if Roe had stood for an inviolate rule of
24 weeks, the Missouri viability testing provision would have been invalid
as a matter of law. Under Roe, therefore, viability is a standard and, in
some situations, will even be applied on a case-by-case basis.
In the end, the decision whether to label a particular fact as doctrinal,
reviewable, or case-specific, depends on what procedural path the Court
wants the fact to walk.77 Once again, the Court's abortion jurisprudence
74. See, e.g., id. at 835-36.
75. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
76. Id. at 526. The statute provided that a 20-week-old fetus was presumed valid, so that
viability testing effectively placed the burden of proof on the woman to disprove viability.
77. This is the lesson that Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo draw-and
advocate-in their excellent article on the law-fact distinction. The article is cited as follows:
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1769 (2003).
[Vol. 36:4
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 644 2008-2009
provides a good example of the freedom inherent in classifying
constitutional facts and the policy ramifications that follow from such
classifications. In Casey, the Court ruled that regulations that impose an
undue burden on the exercise of the right to a pre-viability abortion are
unconstitutional.78 The undue burden standard was operationally defined to
include any regulation that created a "substantial obstacle" to the exercise
of the right.79 In Casey, the Court used this standard to invalidate a spousal
notification provision.80 The opinion for the Court, written jointly by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, treated the issue as a reviewable
fact, finding that research indicated that domestic violence might occur in a
small percentage of cases as a result of this notification requirement.81
There was no suggestion that the claimants before the Court had
experienced, or were in danger of suffering, violence due to the spousal
notification requirement. Yet the prospect of such violence in the class of
possible complainants, even if it constituted only a small percentage of
cases, was enough to invalidate the law in all cases.82
At the same time, the Casey Court upheld the 24-hour waiting
provision, finding the proof inadequate to conclude that such requirements
unduly burden the right. But does this issue implicate a reviewable fact or
a case-specific fact and, if the former, was the appropriate domain the
nation or the state? In A Woman's Choice East Side Women's Clinic v.
Newman,83 the Seventh Circuit provided a confusing answer to this
question. The district court had enjoined Indiana's informed consent law
shortly after it was enacted on the basis that it would constitute an undue
burden.84 Under the Indiana law, women had to wait at least 24 hours after
receiving information regarding the risks of the abortion procedure, thus
necessitating two visits to the abortion provider.85  The lower court
enjoined this provision on the basis of empirical studies conducted in
Mississippi and Utah that indicated that the higher costs it imposed would
reduce the number of abortions performed in those states by 10 percent to
13 percent.86 Yet, as pointed out by the Seventh Circuit, no research was
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 900-01.
81. Id. at 892-93
82. Id. at 892, 894-95.
83. A Woman's Choice E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cit. 2002).
84. A Woman's Choice E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
85. Id. at 1152.
86. Id.at1173.
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available regarding the effect that the present requirement would have in
Indiana, and the researchers had not compared the experience of
Mississippi and Utah to Indiana.8 7 At the same time, however, depending
on how the legal question was defined, the research might not have to
apply specifically to Indiana at all for the Indiana law to be invalidated on
the basis of that research. In other cases, the Court had employed a
national scope for determining when abortion regulations constituted undue
burdens. In Casey itself, as noted above, the Court struck down the spousal
notification provision based on general research and did not inquire
regarding state-wide experience under the challenged Pennsylvania law.88
Similarly, in Stenberg v. Carhart ("Carhart p,), 89 the Court used a national
lens to view the pertinent facts when it invalidated a Nebraska law that
prohibited the use of "intact dilation and extraction," or what critics have
dubbed "partial-birth abortion." 90 After Carhart I, lower courts routinely
considered the relevant level of analysis under Casey to be at the
reviewable fact stage.91
In Casey and Carhart I, the national approach served the strong
jurisprudential value of ensuring consistent constitutional outcomes from
state to state.92  The Newman court explained the Supreme Court's
reasoning:
[Clonstitutionality must be assessed at the level of legislative fact,
rather than adjudicative fact determined by more than 650 district
judges. Only treating the matter as one of legislative fact produces
the nationally uniform approach that [Carhart 1] demands.93
Yet, the Seventh Circuit, after setting forth this sound explication of
why the Court framed the relevant facts under the undue burden test at the
national level, devoted the lion's share of its opinion to evaluating the
applicability of the research to the operation of the challenged provision in
Indiana. The court observed that "because the undue-burden approach
does not prescribe a choice between the legislative-fact and adjudicative-
87. Newman, 305 F.3d at 689.
88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1991).
89. Steinberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
90. Id. at 921.
91. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting)
("The health effects of partial birth abortion should indeed be treated as a legislative fact, rather
than an adjudicative fact, in order to avoid inconsistent results arising from the reactions of
different district judges... to different records."), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
92. Newman, 305 F.3d at 688.
93. Id.
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fact approaches, we think it appropriate to review the evidence in this
record and the inferences that properly may be drawn at the pre-
enforcement stage." 94 Based on this analysis-what essentially constituted
a state level reviewable fact analysis-the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling:
Indiana is entitled to an opportunity to have its law evaluated in light
of experience in Indiana . . . . [I]t is an abuse of discretion for a
district judge to issue a pre-enforcement injunction while the effects
of the law (and reasons for those effects) are open to debate. What
happened in Mississippi and Utah does not imply that the effects in
Indiana are bound to be unconstitutional, so Indiana ... is entitled to
put its law into effect and have that law judged by its own
consequences.
95
The logic of the Seventh Circuit's Newman decision is not obvious.
If, indeed, this area of the law "demands" the application of a "uniform
approach," then the "experience in Indiana" is not particularly relevant to
the ultimate determination. It may be that the Mississippi and Utah studies
were not sufficiently valid or persuasive to conclude that, on a national
scale, informed consent provisions unduly burden the abortion right. But
that is a very different determination than saying that the research does not
apply in Indiana. Indiana's particular experience is largely irrelevant if
Casey's national scope constitutes the applicable test.
Unfortunately, the fact-standard applicable after Casey became
substantially more convoluted with the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart ("Carhart iT'). 96  Without overruling Carhart I explicitly, the
Carhart H Court upheld a virtually identical federal version of the state law
invalidated in the earlier case.97 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
"accepted as controlling here" the undue burden standard of Casey, so that
the Act would be invalid if its "'purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability."' 98 Kennedy further explained that, like both Casey and Carhart
94. Id. at 688-89.
95. Id. at 692-93 (emphasis in original).
96. Gonzalez v. Carhart (Carhart I), 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
97. The Court asserted that the federal ban-the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003-
"departs in material ways from the statute in Stenberg." Id. at 152. None of the lower courts
agreed with this conclusion and it is hard to take seriously. Whatever might be the case, it is
fairly obvious that the different result in Carhart H is not attributable to any difference in the law,
but is due to the changed composition of the Court.
98. Id. at 156 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1991)).
Summer 2009]
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 647 2008-2009
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
1, this challenge involved a "facial attack" on the statute, thus requiring the
Court to determine whether it constitutes a substantial obstacle as
"measured by its text."
The key empirical question presented in Carhart II was whether "the
Act has the effect of imposing an unconstitutional burden on the abortion
right because it does not allow use of the barred procedure where
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the
health of the mother." 99 If the Act subjects women to serious health risks,
then it should be invalid under Casey's standard. But Kennedy asserted
that the question "whether the Act creates serious health risks for women
has been a contested factual question."' ° Kennedy argued that the likely
health effects of the Act were subject to substantial "medical
disagreement."' 0 ' In truth, however, this so-called medical disagreement
was on the level of such scientific disagreements as evolution versus
intelligent design and the reality of global warming. All three lower district
courts agreed that there was, at least, "a significant body of medical
opinion" that the absence of a health exception carried significant health
risks. 10 2  The "scientific" debate over this procedure was largely
manufactured by Congress, which had held highly partisan hearings on the
subject and then concluded that a health exception was not necessary.
Nonetheless, Kennedy relied on this "uncertainty" to support his
conclusion that "the Act can survive this facial attack."'
10 3
Kennedy stated that his view that a medical exception would not
create significant health risks was primarily compelled because the Court
owes "deference" to "congressional factfinding."' 10 4 It appears, however,
that Kennedy is completely confused on this particular matter.
Immediately after expressing the need to "review congressional factfinding
under a deferential standard," he stated that the "Court retains an
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where
constitutional rights are at stake."'0 5 Kennedy thus believed that the Court
should be deferential yet independent, a standard that offers little guidance
and less rationality for future cases.
The core concern in Carhart I was whether banning the abortion
procedure without a health exception created enough of an obstacle to
99. Id. at 161 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 162.
102. Id. at 162-63.
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id. at 165.
105. Id.
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constitute an undue burden. Necessarily, then, the Court had to define the
affected population. The degree of burden cannot be specified without
identifying what percentage of what population confronts what obstacles
due to the law. In Casey, the Court had held that the spousal-notification
provision was invalid because it imposed an undue burden "in a large
fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant."' 0 6 This, of course, involves a
statistical showing, and the constitutionally pertinent populations must be
specified in order to define what statistics are relevant. In Casey, the state
had argued that only about 1 percent of women would be adversely
affected by the notification requirement, primarily due to fear of abuse if
they were forced to notify their spouses.107 The Casey Court rejected the
state's definition of the relevant population, holding that the "proper focus
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction."
' 0 8
Among that group (i.e., the 1 percent of all women seeking abortions who
feared abuse), the Court stated that the notification requirement "will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion" in "a large fraction of the cases."
' 109
In Carhart II, in contrast, Kennedy offered the conclusory statement
that the challengers of the Act did not "demonstrate[] that [it] would be
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases." 10 The "relevant
cases" for Kennedy were "all instances in which the doctor proposes to use
the prohibited procedure, not merely those in which the woman suffers
from medical complications."'' But this makes no sense because the
constitutional issue concerned whether the law constituted a substantial
obstacle given that it lacked a health exception. Under the Casey standard
that the denominator is defined by "the group for whom the law is a
restriction," the lack of a health restriction would have likely produced a
substantial obstacle for women who needed the procedure due to medical
complications. For those presenting medical complications that indicated
the need for the prohibited procedure, the lack of a health exception would
likely have been unduly burdensome for a very large fraction of these
cases. If, indeed, the law posed a substantial obstacle to a "large fraction"
of these women, then Carhart H squarely contradicts Casey.
In the end, therefore, Kennedy concluded that the "medical
disagreement" was enough to defeat a facial challenge of the federal law.
106. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1991).
107. Id. at 894.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 895.
110. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 167-68.
111. Id.
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He argued that the uncertainties attending the health risks created by the
federal law made a facial attack unsuitable. He explained, "In these
circumstances the proper means to consider exceptions is by as-applied
challenge .... In an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk
can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack."'1 12  The
question raised by the facial challenge-whether the Act challenged in
Carhart II creates general health risks for women seeking abortions-was a
reviewable fact, just like the facts presented in Casey and Carhart II.
Almost invariably, facial challenges present either doctrinal or reviewable
constitutional facts since they necessarily transcend individual cases. But
Kennedy is simply incorrect to suggest that medical risk can be "better
quantified and balanced" in as-applied challenges as opposed to facial
challenges. In fact, as demonstrated below,113 medical risk is more
typically-and more readily-assessed in populations than in individuals.
In any case, as an empirical matter there is nothing inherent in reviewable
facts that make them less amenable to proof than case-specific facts.
Indeed, the reviewable fact Kennedy found so resistant to proof was found
conclusively in the challengers' favor by three federal district courts after
each held extensive hearings on the matter.
By turning the facial challenge into an as-applied challenge, Kennedy
essentially transformed the relevant constitutional inquiry from an analysis
of reviewable facts into a consideration of case-specific facts. Enormous
constitutional consequences follow this rhetorical move, and the Court
utterly failed to take them into account. Kennedy gave no consideration in
Carhart II to the concrete constitutional implications of the Court's
decision to reject a facial challenge in lieu of the availability of as-applied
challenges. Indeed, the Court rarely contemplates the constitutional
ramifications that attend its definition of the applicable rules or standards
that it develops to operationalize constitutional principles. As in Carhart
II, a large proportion of this matter concerns the Court's distinguishing
between facial and as-applied challenges. But the decision over when to
permit facial challenges is actually a subset of the more general
phenomenon regarding the Court's operationalization of the Constitution.
The next section turns to this foundational issue.
112. Idat 167.
113. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the inherent difficulty in assessing validity of
predictions of violence in particular cases and concluding that general assessments are more
easily quantified).
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H. Choosing a Frame of Reference
Determining whether a constitutional provision raises factual issues,
and the kinds of facts that are relevant to particular constitutional inquiries,
has obvious practical significance. For instance, if systemic discrimination
is sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation (i.e., a reviewable
fact), a substantial statistical showing will be highly relevant, if not
dispositive, in the case. If, however, the complainant must show
individualized discrimination (i.e., a case-specific fact), statistical
demonstrations of disparate impact will have little or no probative force. In
McCleskey, for instance, when the Court rejected the relevance of the
reviewable fact of systemic discrimination in favor of a rule requiring proof
of the case-specific fact of particularized and purposeful discrimination, it
fundamentally altered the form of litigation. Prior to McCleskey, statistical
proof of systemic discrimination could establish an Eighth Amendment
violation. After McCleskey, a claimant must demonstrate that the jury,
judge, or prosecutor intentionally discriminated against him or her. While
establishing statistical proof of discrimination is no easy task, requiring
proof of individualized discrimination in a capital case creates a nearly
insuperable obstacle to overcome.
The shift in perspective in McCleskey transformed the litigation under
the applicable constitutional provision from a general category of cases to
individualized litigation. It changed the decision from an at-large
determination of constitutional validity to a case-by-case constitutional
assessment. The relevant fact changed from reviewable to case-specific.
When the Court, however, describes the pertinent fact as reviewable, its
determination of the fact-of-the-matter resolves an entire class of cases. In
Roper v. Simmons, 114 for instance, the Court held that the death penalty
could not be constitutionally applied to any defendant who had killed prior
to his or her eighteenth birthday. One of the principal bases for this
decision was the finding that minors are not as psychologically mature as
adults and, thereby, not fully culpable for their criminal conduct.' 15 Before
Roper, a defendant's psychological development was something juries
could take into account in deciding sentencing. 16 It was a case-specific
fact. In Roper, this matter became a reviewable fact. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, stated that "[t]he difference between juvenile and
114. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
115. Id. at 571.
116. Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The criminal justice system, by contrast, provides for
individualized consideration of each defendant. In capital cases, this Court requires the sentencer
to make an individualized determination, which includes weighing aggravating factors and
mitigating factors, such as youth." (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17(1982)).
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adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability. ' 17 Moreover, Kennedy observed that even though some
juvenile offenders possess adult-level competency, psychologists cannot
reliably identify this subset.' 18 He stated, "It is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."'1 9  Justice O'Connor, in
contrast, argued in dissent "that a legislature may reasonably conclude that
at least some 1 7-year-olds can act with sufficient moral culpability, and can
be sufficiently deterred by the threat of execution, that capital punishment
may be warranted in an appropriate case."' 20 The relevant factual inquiry
under the Eighth Amendment for O'Connor, then, would be case-specific.
As McCleskey and Roper illustrate, the kind of facts found to have
constitutional relevance can fundamentally impact the scope of the
constitutional interests at stake. How-indeed, whether-a constitutional
fact can be proven will often turn on the way the relevant inquiry is
defined, that is, as a doctrinal, reviewable, or case-specific fact. This
matter has potentially profound implications, not simply for the manner in
which constitutional litigation proceeds, but for the scope of protection
afforded basic rights. In the First Amendment area, for instance, defining
the government's interest in protecting children as a reviewable fact in
child pornography cases, rather than as a case-specific fact in which local
community standards would be consulted on a case-by-case basis, impacts
the very exercise of the right itself. In New York v. Ferber,12 the Court
rejected Justice Brennan's call for case-by-case assessments of
pornographic materials depicting children, and instead adopted a per se rule
permitting blanket prohibitions. 122 Justice White, writing for the majority
in Ferber, thus treated the empirical effects of child pornography as a
reviewable fact and set forth a rule for all similarly situated cases. 123 As
Justice Brennan pointed out, this means that, by definition, some offending
117. Id. at 572-73.
118. Id. at 573.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 600 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
122. Id. at 773.
123. In individual cases, of course, child pornography prosecutions still present numerous
case-specific facts-such as whether real children were used in the filming or whether the acts
depicted qualify under the applicable statute-but these are "plain facts" which come largely
unentangled with constitutional norms. Nonetheless, even plain facts have constitutional
implications and thus these are a specie of case-specific constitutional facts.
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materials with scientific, literary, or artistic value will be censored by
Ferber's blanket prohibition. 124 By treating the constitutional inquiry as
raising reviewable facts, the basic rule the Court devised was, as most rules
are, somewhat over-inclusive. Hence, some speech that would have been
covered under a scheme of case-by-case assessment will be left unprotected
under the Ferber at-large approach.
A. Facial Versus Applied Challenges
The choice between facial and as-applied challenges is a specie of the
more general question presented in constitutional cases involving the
necessity of defining the frame of reference by which a case or cases will
be assessed. For all practical purposes, for instance, the Roper Court had to
choose between assessing the Missouri capital sentencing scheme on its
face or as-applied. Although it did not describe the matter in exactly this
way is not particularly relevant. Indeed, the Court explicitly accepted that
some juveniles possessed adult-level competency; the difficulty lay in
distinguishing those who do from the vast majority who do not. As-applied
adjudication was possible in Roper, therefore, but not without considerable
constitutional costs being imposed. Significantly, the Court was guided by
the impracticalities associated with as-applied adjudication in ultimately
invalidating capital punishment wholesale for those who killed before
turning eighteen. Yet, in other cases, the Court has stated that as-applied
adjudication is the default option in constitutional cases, notwithstanding
the potential difficulties that might be associated with proving
constitutional violations one case at a time. As this section explains, this
default rule in favor of as-applied constitutional adjudication is not sound
in theory or in practice.
The signature case for the asserted preference for as-applied
constitutional adjudication is United States v. Salerno.'25 In Salerno, the
Court rejected a facial challenge to the United States Bail Reform Act's
pretrial detention provision, holding that due process does not prohibit
detentions based on predictions of future violence. The Court stated that
"[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."'' 26 As this
statement suggests, Salerno sets forth a vision of constitutional
adjudication in which the presumptive form of constitutional adjudication
124. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
126. Id. at 746.
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is the individual case. In particular, Salerno preferences "as-applied"
challenges, thus conforming to romantic notions of a restrained judiciary,
one that limits the Court to deciding the specific case before it. Inherent in
this approach is the Court's apparent belief that the constitutional issues
presented in facial challenges are the same as those presented in as-applied
challenges, just many times more so. The Salerno rule contemplates that
facial challenges are merely the sum of all of the parts of as-applied
challenges.1 27  Salerno, under this view, does not alter the content of
constitutional analysis, it merely mandates that each case be considered
separately and on its own merits. But Salerno does much more than simply
uncouple constitutional challenges. It fundamentally changes the substance
of the constitutional analysis in these cases. In short, constitutional
reviewable facts are not simply the sum total of all of the case-specific facts
that fall within the pertinent constitutional category. This is so for several
reasons, including: (1) because courts discover reviewable facts in
fundamentally different ways than how they discover case-specific facts;
(2) because different fact-finders are charged with deciding different kinds
of constitutional facts; and (3) because the transaction costs, which ought to
be relevant to any constitutional inquiry, are profoundly different when the
Constitution is read as guaranteeing merely retail fairness rather than
wholesale fairness.
This section focuses on the first of these reasons, while the following
section considers, among other matters, the second and the third. It is not
at all unusual, as reflected in Salerno, for the Court to see no basic
difference between resolving constitutional cases at the reviewable fact
level and resolving them at the case-specific fact level. The choice of
factual frame of reference, however, profoundly affects substantive
constitutional adjudication. This was particularly well illustrated in
McCleskey, discussed above. By holding in McCleskey that the proper
frame of reference was whether discrimination occurred at the case-specific
level, rather than at the reviewable fact level of systemic discrimination, the
Court effectively rendered moot this entire class of constitutional
litigation. 128
127. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2005)
("Salerno permits a facial challenge only in cases in which every plaintiff would win an as-
applied challenge, i.e., those cases in which the government cannot validly apply the statute to
anyone."); Matthew Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 154-55 (1998) ("Salerno says... the following: Given
some rule R, a court should facially invalidate R only if, for every person X against whom R
might be enforced, the application of R to X would be unconstitutional.").
128. See discussion supra Part I.A.
[Vol. 36:4
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 654 2008-2009
Salerno thus represents merely a case-in-point of the Court's general
inattention to the pivotal consideration of framing constitutional questions.
The debate over facial versus as-applied challenges is part of the larger and
ever present struggle over how constitutional issues should be framed. In
Brown, as described above, the Court had to choose between describing the
relevant issue as whether, on the one hand, racial segregation caused
deleterious consequences in particular school districts or, on the other hand,
segregation caused deleterious consequences generally. It chose the latter
course, though in its opinion it did not defend, or even acknowledge, this
choice. Although the Court necessarily attends to the empirical world in
implementing the Constitution, the justices seemingly have little
understanding of the methodological complexities that arise in the process
of measuring that world. This leads the Court to believe that as-applied
challenges are functionally equivalent to facial challenges as a
constitutional matter. This is demonstrably not the case.
B. Salerno and Why All Facts are Not Equal
The defendant in Salerno argued that the Bail Reform Act's use of the
criterion of "dangerousness to the community" violated due process.
129
According to the defendant, the Act constituted "punishment" and was
facially invalid. 130 The Court determined, however, that Congress intended
the Act to be regulatory, not punitive. 131 It served the legitimate
"regulatory interest in community safety."' 132  But the strength of the
government's regulatory interest necessarily depended on the means it had
available to effectuate that interest. In particular, and central to the
constitutional analysis in Salerno, was the matter of predicting violence.
This factual issue might have been defined at either the reviewable fact or
case-specific fact level. The reviewable fact would revolve around
psychological professionals' ability to predict violence and, in particular,
the methodological bases for the tools they use. The case-specific fact
would concern the basis for individual predictions of violence in particular
cases. These two frames of reference are deeply dissimilar, and the choice
between them substantially affects the Constitution's meaning.
If the relevant inquiry in Salerno had been identified as a reviewable
fact, it would have been incumbent on the Court to consider the research
basis for predictions of violence in general. After all, Congress's
129. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 748.
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regulatory interest in non-punitive pretrial detention could not be
maintained if the stated regulatory purpose of detaining the dangerous
arrestee could not be achieved as an empirical matter. Indeed, despite the
Court's rush to individualized adjudication, presumably if the Act
prescribed the use of crystal balls to decide which arrestees to detain, the
Act would have been unconstitutional on its face. In fact, many methods of
violence prediction are little better than crystal balls, if better at all. Yet the
Court said nothing regarding the government's claimed ability to achieve
its interests of making the community safer by selectively identifying the
likely-to-be-violent arrestees. The Court merely opined that "there is
nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal
conduct."' 33  This statement-the Court's only nod to the empirical
footings that underlay the government's action-is breathtakingly inane.
Presumably, the Court believed that such details would be addressed later
in as-applied challenges.
By defining the frame of reference as case-by-case adjudication, the
Court defined the relevant constitutional inquiry as a case-specific fact,
rather than a reviewable fact. After Salerno, an arrestee would be obliged
to demonstrate that the prediction of violence in his case was erroneous.
Admittedly, this proof could include the general lack of validity of
predictions of violence because if crystal balls cannot predict the future
generally, they also cannot do so in specific cases. Moreover, if predictions
of violence are so unreliable that they should not be permitted in any case,
then arguably the case-specific fact would effectively morph into the
reviewable fact and the Salerno standard itself would be met: "no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."' 134 Hence, in
theory, though it might take considerable time and resources, the
government's crystal ball gazing methodology would be struck down in
case after case until the Act's general validity would be undermined. But
fact-finding of the reviewable or case-specific types is never so neat as all
that.
What is missing when the Court ignores the relevant frame of
reference is a constitutional weighing of the real costs associated with the
decision. On its own terms, Salerno is a case of explicit balancing: "[T]he
Government's regulatory interest in community safety can [sometimes] ...
outweigh an individual's liberty interest."' 35 This balance must necessarily
depend in substantial part on the validity of the tools the government
133. Id. at 751.
134. Id. at 745.
135. Id. at 748.
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employs to effectuate community safety. Crystal balls would not be a
reasonable means to effectuate the government interest, but a valid
actuarial test might be adequate. Suppose, for instance, that the
government's pretrial detention test identifies 40 percent of those who
would be violent if released. This rate might be high enough to allow the
government's interest in community safety to outweigh the individual's
liberty interest, but it is not obviously so. If the Court is going to balance,
as it purportedly did in Salerno, it should be obliged to identify the factors
it put on the scales and at least make a showing of deliberating over their
respective weights.
Yet, given Salerno's injunction that the statute could be applied in a
constitutional manner in some cases, the 40 percent true-positive rate
would seemingly be sufficient. In forty out of every one hundred cases the
government would be protecting the community and would not be
detaining a non-dangerous arrestee. The challenge presented by Salerno,
of course, would come in the case-by-case adjudication of the one hundred
cases in order to identify the forty correct ones. The problems with this
approach are manifold, some empirical and some legal.
As an empirical matter, knowing the true-positive rate allows us to
conclude theoretically that the Salerno standard is met, but this has no
practical consequence. We may know that predictions of violence have a
success rate of 40 percent, but we do not know which ones are correct. If
we knew beforehand which predictions were incorrect, we could correct
those mistakes in the first place. Hence, where error may be recognizable
in a class of cases, it may be practically unknowable in particular cases. In
a set of one hundred cases in which a prediction of violence was made,
every arrestee would look alike on this variable. After all, that is how they
were placed in the set in the first place-they were each detained based on
a prediction of violence. As a set, we know that only forty of these
predictions will be accurate, and the best that can be done is to infer a
similar accuracy rate for each arrestee. Hence, the legal issue in Salerno
cases-regarding whether community safety outweighs an arrestee's liberty
interests-is only cognizable at a general level.
In fact, however, the statistical underpinnings of predictions of
violence are likely to be ignored in case-by-case adjudication. Individual
cases are usually litigated on the basis of the professional credentials of the
parties' experts and the reasons the experts believe the arrestee to be
dangerous or not. Judges are likely to have little patience for the repeated
adjudication of the general empirical question of the validity of clinical
predictions of violence. After all, the Court itself said that "there is nothing
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inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."' 136 A
reasonable trial judge might conclude that the Court had already looked
into this matter. He or she would be mistaken. The Court considered the
reviewable fact largely irrelevant, since it rejected the facial challenge, thus
wrongly believing that the underlying empirical issue might be adjudicated
in as-applied litigation. In effect, the core empirical issue presented in
pretrial preventive detention cases vanished in Salerno's rhetorical
maneuver.
The empirical bait-and-switch of Salerno buried the value choices
endemic to the constitutional balance the Court held to be inherent in the
substantive due process analysis that it ostensibly applied. It may be, for
instance, that the government's regulatory interest in community safety
outweighs liberty interests when the reliability of predictions of violence
exceed 90 percent. But if reliability rates were below 15 percent, the
balance might swing against the government's claim. What reliability rate
is necessary to outweigh the liberty interest is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. This is a fact that can only be assessed at the reviewable fact
level and thus the analysis should at least have to begin there-based on the
Court's own statement of the Constitution's meaning. Salerno elides this
analysis by shifting the relevant frame of reference to individual cases and
the Court thus evades consideration of the true costs of its decision.
III. Defining Frames of Reference
The proper frame of reference for deciding constitutional cases should
be an explicit component of constitutional interpretation. Of course, like
other interpretive matters, there is no objective or definite answer to the
question of what frame of reference should be employed in a particular
constitutional context. The choice of frame of reference, like questions
regarding the reach of "free speech" in the First Amendment or the
meaning of "equal protection" in the Fourteenth Amendment, must depend
on the text of the Constitution and the sundry authorities regularly relied
upon for gleaning the text's meaning. In McCleskey,13 1 then, the question
whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment" is concerned with systemic discrimination, individualized
discrimination, or both, must be determined from traditional sources of
constitutional interpretation. Similarly, the issue in Roper,'3 8 whether the
mental competency of minors for Eighth Amendment purposes should be
136. Id. at 751.
137. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
138. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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measured individually or collectively, depends on the meaning of that
constitutional provision. Once defined, frames of reference provide the
lens through which concrete cases are adjudicated. Frames of reference
give operational effect to the Constitution. The problem lies in defining the
appropriate frame of reference for the constitutional task at hand.
This section does not set forth a recipe for identifying appropriate
frames of reference in different constitutional contexts. There are as many
frameworks to be defined as there are constitutional issues to be resolved.
Nonetheless, just as certain guides to general constitutional interpretation
can be identified-including the text, original intent, precedent, and so
on-certain factors ought to be consulted regarding what frame of
reference should be employed in particular contexts. These might include
the following: (1) the empirical practicability of conducting meaningful
case-by-case analyses, (2) the constitutional values at risk in failing to
adopt an at-large decision, and (3) the constitutionally cognizable costs
associated with at-large decisions versus case-by-case adjudication.
A. The Empirical Practicability of Conducting Meaningful
Case-by-Case Analyses
A key consideration in determining whether particular constitutional
challenges should be resolved at-large or case-by-case must be whether
claimed violations can be effectively measured one case at a time. In
Roper,'39 for example, the Court held that executing minors who had killed
violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
The basic rationale driving this judgment was that juveniles, on the whole,
are developmentally incapable of having the mental and behavioral
capacity to be fully culpable for their criminal conduct. 40  The Court
recognized, however, that this empirical judgment was not absolute, for
certainly some offenders younger than eighteen possessed adult-level
competency. 4 ' The difficulty lay in reliably distinguishing one case from
another. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, observed, "It is difficult
even for psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."'
' 42
The problem of individualizing constitutional standards is both
pervasive and is a consequence of at least two separate causes, one
139. Id.
140. Id. at 572-73.
141. Id. at 574.
142. Id. at 573.
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primarily empirical and the other primarily legal. First, empirically, as
illustrated by Roper, it is very often possible to identify a general
phenomenon but have little ability to determine whether any particular case
is an instance of that phenomenon. Second, as a legal matter, the move
from an at-large determination to a case-by-case evaluation will sometimes
alter the sort of evidence that is probative of the fact in question, possibly
making it virtually immune to proof altogether. I consider these in turn.
A point I have made elsewhere in the basic evidentiary context is very
much applicable in constitutional cases. Specifically, the scientist's basic
methodology is not well tailored to the seeming default rule in the law of
individualized adjudication. A fundamental problem in the receipt of all
scientific evidence is the different starting points for empirical inquiry in
science and law: "While science attempts to discover the universals hiding
among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding
among the universals." 143 Therefore, to take a simple evidentiary example,
research might demonstrate unequivocally that second-hand smoke causes
lung cancer, but it might not be possible to determine validly whether a
particular person's lung cancer is attributable to second-hand smoke. The
general phenomenon might be very well understood, but valid diagnostic
tests might still be unavailable.
Consider, for instance, a comparison of Roper with another death
penalty case of recent vintage: Atkins v. Virginia.'44 In Atkins, the Court
held that executing a mentally retarded defendant who had killed violated
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In
reasoning later echoed in the Roper case, the Court concluded that mentally
retarded individuals did not have the intellectual capacity to be held fully
responsible for their conduct. 145 Unlike Roper, however, Atkins will be
applied case-by-case. 46  Although the Court could have defined the
applicable class categorically, as it did in Roper, it chose to permit state-by-
state development of the diagnostic criteria that would meet the
constitutional standard. 147 The viability of this application, then, depends
on the validity of the diagnostic tests used to distinguish mentally retarded
individuals from the rest of the population.
148
143. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW
69(1999).
144. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
145. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
146. Seeid. at317.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 309 n.5.
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Atkins, therefore, illustrates the two levels of generality at which
empirical evidence might come into the courtroom in constitutional cases
or otherwise. These levels are general or specific. At the general level, the
empirical issue in Atkins concerned whether there is a group of identifiable
capital defendants whose mental functioning is so deficient that it relieves
them of full responsibility for their behavior in a way that it would be cruel
and unusual to execute them. If there is such a group, the next issue is
whether a diagnostic test is available by which it can be determined
whether a particular individual is a member of this group. In Roper, the
Court answered the first issue in the affirmative, but the second issue in the
negative; in Atkins, the Court answered both issues in the affirmative.
The second and somewhat more basic problem associated with
individualizing constitutional standards is legal in nature. Specifically, as a
practical matter, the Court's rejection of an at-large constitutional challenge
will often fundamentally change the nature of the proof that will be
probative in the matter. A particularly clear example of this occurred in
McCleskey, discussed above. Although the defendant introduced strong
evidence of systemic bias in the pattern of capital sentences handed down
in Georgia,149 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment required case-by-
case proof of discrimination. "° Whereas it was possible to isolate the
effect of race on a population of decisions using sophisticated statistical
techniques, proof of particularized discrimination in this context was a
practical impossibility. McCleskey's individualized claim would have
possibly involved the judge, the prosecutor, or the jury in his case.
Needless to point out perhaps, but the law does not afford defendants an
effective route by which to discover implicit or explicit prejudice among
these decision makers. Following the McCleskey decision, then, there was
no practicable way of conducting a meaningful case-by-case analysis of an
alleged constitutional violation.
B. The Constitutional Values at Risk in Failing to Adopt an
At-Large Decision
Perhaps the one area in which the Court has given significant attention
to the issue of frames of reference, though not in so many words, is the
overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment. In particular, the
overbreadth doctrine induces the Court to take into account the
consequences associated with the form of the Court's analysis. In this one
area, the Court displays an understanding that form affects content.
149. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987).
150. Id. at 279-80.
Summer 2009]
HeinOnline -- 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 661 2008-2009
662 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 36:4
Overbreadth doctrine dictates that the Court consider the effects statutes
have generally on free speech, because of the prospect that "the statute's
very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected... expression.' 5 ' Because of the chilling effect
that a law might have on those not parties to the case, overbreadth requires
that the Court analyze constitutionality in these cases at a general level of
abstraction. Case-by-case adjudication, it is argued, might permit negative
constitutional outcomes simply by virtue of this form of resolution.
Form affects content in most constitutional arenas. Yet the Court has
not undertaken to extend its recognition of this fact outside of the First
Amendment. The important point, however, is not that the Court should
employ overbreadth-like analyses in every constitutional area. But it
should consider the reasons why such an analysis might-or might not-be
indicated and give its reasons for selecting either a general or a specific
frame of reference for resolving a dispute.
Much of the Court's abortion jurisprudence appeared to parallel the
reasoning that supported the at-large approach to free speech cases. Just as
in the context of speech, where the mere prospect of a statute could chill a
person's exercise of a fundamental right, the prospect of having to hurdle
the substantial obstacles established in restrictive abortion regulations
could chill a woman's exercise of her right of privacy. Moreover, requiring
case-by-case adjudication, particularly in the abortion context, is inherently
burdensome-and thus chilling-and leaves the prospect of having one's
rights vindicated, at best, ambiguous. In decision after decision following
Roe-which itself was an at-large, styled decision-the Court resolved
constitutional disputes involving the reconciliation of the woman's right to
have an abortion and the state's interest in restricting abortions at the
general (or facial) level of constitutional analysis. These matters were
resolved based on the reviewable or doctrinal facts of the matter, whether
the woman or the state prevailed on the issue. This was true for parental
notification/consent provisions, informed consent and 24-hour waiting
requirements, and spousal notification provisions. In all of these cases, the
constitutional value associated with the right of privacy seemed to
necessitate resolution of disputed claims at the general level. Privacy, like
speech, appeared to be too important a constitutional value to leave to the
vagaries of case-by-case adjudication.
151. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 861-62 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 694-701
(1978).
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C. The Constitutionally Cognizable Costs Associated with At-Large
Decisions Versus Case-by-Case Adjudication
No case better illustrates the costs associated with choosing frames of
reference than Carhart II. As detailed above, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, rejected a facial challenge to the Act after determining that
substantial uncertainty surrounded the issue of whether a health exception
was necessary to such a ban. Importantly, however, Kennedy assumed that
a health exception was probably warranted in some percentage of cases-
just not "a large fraction of relevant cases."' 5 2  But Kennedy did not
contemplate the constitutional costs imposed on the fraction that would be
affected by the absence of a health exception. He simply concluded that
"[t]he Act is open to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete case."' 53
Consider, however, the real costs of requiring an as-applied challenge
to the Act. A proper as-applied challenge would, at bottom, involve a
woman who confronted potential health complications with a second
trimester abortion. The woman would have to petition a court to enjoin
application of the statute to her. This would entail filing pleadings,
obtaining affidavits from experts, and participating in an adversarial
hearing on the merits. Although data is not available on this specific
question, it seems quite unlikely that many as-applied challenges will be
brought, not because they are without merit, but because the structural
impediments are too great. Kennedy's opinion suggesting as-applied
challenges as a bona fide alternative is either self-delusion of the highest
magnitude or a crass political maneuver designed to dispose of all of these
cases, notwithstanding substantial health risks created for women, without
owning up to that reality.
In effect, therefore, by moving the frame of reference from an at-large
determination to a to case-by-case determination, the Court made it
impossible for women to vindicate a right that the Court itself said existed:
the right of a woman to choose a pre-viability abortion without undue
interference by the government. The Court left women without the
procedural wherewithal to exercise that right. Ironically, the realities of
bringing an as-applied challenge to the federal ban on "partial-birth"
abortions arguably violates the Court's own undue burden standard. An
undue burden was defined empirically as constituting a "substantial
obstacle" to the exercise of the right. 154 Any reasonable consideration of
the practical realities associated with bringing an as-applied challenge after
152. Id. at 167-68.
153. Id. at 168.
154. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1991).
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Carhart II would have to conclude that the legal processes involved would
create nearly insuperable barriers to such a challenge.
A basic error in the Court's approach in Carhart II was its failure to
realistically assess the opportunity for an individual woman to vindicate her
basic right to a pre-viability abortion. The Court ostensibly accepted that
some fraction of women should have access to the prohibited procedure
due to medical complications.155 Yet it provided no adequate means by
which this right could be effectuated case-by-case. Indeed, even if the
Court is disinclined to resolve a challenge at-large, it is possible for it to
seriously engage the question of how case-by-case adjudication should
proceed in an effective manner. In other contexts, for example, the Court
has recognized the facial validity of a statutory scheme, but mandated a
procedural edifice that would ensure the efficacy of as-applied challenges.
For example, in Hodgson v. Minnesota,156 the Court upheld a law
mandating parental consent on the basis of the state's overriding interest in
promoting family cohesion. The Court recognized, however, that
individual cases might depart from the sanguine view of the family held by
the state. 157 In such cases, the young woman's basic right to choose an
abortion might have been unduly interfered with. The Court, therefore,
devised a procedural framework, the judicial bypass, that would ensure that
as-applied challenges would not be superfluous. In Carhart II, a frank
assessment of the consequences of insisting on as-applied challenges might
have led the Court to either abandon this line of analysis or identify a
mechanism that would have given some substance to such challenges.
Conclusion
The Court has long overlooked the issues raised when it defines the
empirical frames of reference by which it evaluates constitutional cases.
Indeed, the Court has long assumed that the procedural decision regarding
the level of generality employed to measure the constitutionality of some
action does not affect substantive outcomes. In setting forth the
jurisprudential implications of the choice between facial and as-applied
challenges, for instance, the Court never mentions the fundamentally
different forms of empirical proof that the two demand. In a nutshell, the
Court appears to assume that general challenges to a law's application are
merely the sum of the many individual challenges that might be brought
155. Gonzalez v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007).
156. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
157. Id. at 437-39.
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under the law. But even brief reflection, with just a modicum of empirical
sophistication, reveals that this is manifestly not true.
This Article explores how defining facts at different levels of
generality can fundamentally affect outcomes in constitutional cases. It
outlines a useful taxonomy of constitutional facts-including doctrinal
facts, reviewable facts, and case-specific facts-and discusses how each is
distinguished from the other two. Whereas doctrinal facts are employed to
define an applicable rule or standard, reviewable facts are resolved under
some particular rule or standard. Hence, historical evidence might be
relevant to setting "viability" as the point-in-time when states can proscribe
abortions and, in this way, historical facts operate as doctrinal facts. The
medical fact of when viability occurs-i.e., a fetus can survive outside the
mother's womb-is a reviewable fact, one that has been found to occur
around the end of the second trimester. The question of whether a
particular fetus is viable or not would be an example of a case-specific fact.
Much turns on whether the Court defines the relevant inquiry as
involving doctrinal, reviewable, or case-specific facts. The choice of fact
affects, among other things, the nature of the proof that can be used, the
practical availability of proof, the identity of the fact finders, and the
standards of review that apply. Because choice of fact affects
constitutional outcomes, no simple default rule-such as the presumptive
preference of as-applied challenges to facial challenges-can be sensibly
employed. The decision regarding what level of fact is implicated must
depend on an interpretation of the pertinent constitutional provision. This
ought to depend on, among other possible considerations, the practicability
of conducting meaningful case-by-case determinations, the constitutional
values implicated, and the constitutionally cognizable costs associated with
at-large decisions versus case-by-case adjudication.
Historically, the Court has not demonstrated an impressive quotient of
empirical sophistication. This deficit has led it to miscomprehend and
underestimate the impact that threshold issues of fact definition can have
on substantive outcomes in constitutional cases. It is about time that the
Court improves this quotient, for substantive constitutional rights depend
on it.
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